Book Review Article
René de Saint-Denis, The Songs and Laments of Loōmos,
Laocoōn
Press, 2021, 128 pp.
With his Loōmos book the author attempts a
presentation of art as an integrated whole. As the subtitle tells us, “Text,
drawings, paintings, music and sculpture” are included here. We read the words
of the book, but, simultaneously, we interact with everything else. We, of course,
do not interact directly with the sculptures by Saint-Denis—here we must be
content with their visual representations. Nor do we hear the actual music, as
this is not an audiobook. But the final section, “Songs and Laments,”—four
separate pieces comprising a total of fourteen pages—consists entirely of
musical notations.
Therefore, in order to “hear” the music of the final section
you have to be a musician yourself, able to read the notes provided on paper.
The author may have considered publishing an audiobook, or including a CD of
the final section with this paperback. But then again, given certain unique and
avant-garde features of Loōmos, he may have deliberately
intended the final section not to be played. So as to achieve something
like what the composer John Cage created when he wrote his famous composition
consisting of silence. All the musicians sit in stillness on the proscenium, holding
their instruments, while the conductor stills his baton and all his
gesticulations. The “music” consists of isolated coughs and throat-clearings
from the audience, plus a few car horns blowing and ambulance sirens from the
outside world.
At any rate, this is a book of fiction with words, so we
read it, but we soon discover that it is to be read in ways not congruent with
the normal ways of reading a story for the plot or the sense of the text. The
book has, in essence, no plot, and the sound of the words is sometimes more
important than their meaning. Therefore, the reader rather drifts through the
text, communing simultaneously with the graphic imagery (the paintings,
drawings, sculptures on pages facing the text).
In the foreword R.G. Skinner explains how everything is
integrated into one harmonic whole. “[The] images often serve as a subtext, or
an alternate text running parallel with the literal text. In this sense the
work is also a kind of Emblem Book, in which the illustrations serve as emblems
or allegories of the text, commenting on them and creating a larger context of
association and meaning. In that there are characteristically single symbolic
episodes, they relate more to an unfolding situation, than to a consecutive
narrative.”
The scope of the project, the broadness of its intent, is
suggested by epigraphs to each of the individual sections. For example, the
page following the foreword includes epigraphs from Hesiod, Tennyson and
Chateaubriand. To cite only the last of these: “Our heart is a defective
instrument, a lyre with several chords missing, which forces us to express our
joyful moods in notes meant for lamentation.” Quickly skipping forward from the
age of antiquity into the twentieth century, such epigraphs (and thoughts in
the text) skim across, and sometimes delve deeply into the whole tradition of
Western philosophy and thought.
As for the text itself, it describes the wanderings of a man
named Loōmos,
born, apparently, in Greece, but exactly when we do not know. Inhabiting, for
the most part, no specific place or time, he has devoted his life to musing and
philosophizing. Here’s how the story begins (p. 3): “Beneath a brooding sky Loōmos
walked beside the Aegean, near his birthplace from long ago, watching the birds
play in the marsh grass, and the bees hover in amongst the rosehips. He was
content to move slowly about the dunes, looking around him as he went and from
time to time thinking about his life and the things he had seen and thought.
[paragraph break] In his lonely youth he studied philosophy, the sciences, and
mathematics, so that he might understand his place in the Universe.”
This is pretty much what the central—almost only—character
does for the whole rest of the book. This first page also suggests some of the
difficulties involved in reading the text. Here are mentioned, e.g., “the
aporias of the Megarians,” and “the Paradox of the Liar.” Then comes a
disquisition on numbers: “just as the sequence 0,1,2 . . . can never be
completed in the sense that it has no last member, the sequence . . ., -2,-1,0
cannot be completed in the sense that it has no first member, . . .” From this we
go on to “a logical paradox, much like Xenophanes’, which pitted the ideas of
infinite space and timelessness against those of finite space and time.”
That’s a lot to digest on one page, and only a reader who is
something of a polymath could cope with all the personages and ideas mentioned.
Take aporia. Look it up. In
rhetoric, an aporia is “a professing, or matter about which one professes, to
be at a loss what course to pursue, where to begin, what to say, etc.” Look up
“Megarian” and you learn that this pertains to Megara, a city in Ancient
Greece. The Megarian School was “a school of philosophers established at Megara
by Euclid, a disciple of Socrates, who taught that the good is one, and is the
only true being.” Xenophanes was an “Eleatic philosopher, noteworthy for his
emphatic (perhaps pantheistic) monotheism.”
None of this really get us very far, unless (the reader
suspects) one has a Ph.D. in classical literature or philosophy. At times we
drown in references to real or imagined personages. See, e.g., p. 30, the list
of sages come down from time immemorial, whom Loōmos decides to study:
“Oreastos, Xertis, Crosos, Practos, Zenaster, Reoem, . . .” etc., etc.—this
goes on much longer than one would hope. My trusty spell checker on the
computer puts red lines under all these names. Don’t know for sure, but I
suspect that some of these characters may even be fictitious, and that the long
list for effect is the most important thing here.
Sometimes it seems as if the author were inviting the reader
to research the many names dropped in the book. As if to say, “Here they are.
What, you don’t know who they are, the great thinkers of the Western (and
sometimes Eastern) world? If not, look them up!” Another possibility: by
drowning us in the mention of great men and great ideas—which men and ideas we
have never heard of—the author is reinforcing one of the central ideas of the
book: that human thought goes round and round but never really gets anywhere.
Logic is flawed, as Loōmos discovers early on. The
Logicians founder in the very logic they hold up as a beacon, wondering “if it
were not more a matter of infinite regress, a stalemate in a heretical game”
(41). Philosophy is suspect, and words are nebulous in their meanings. “But if
logic is defined as a theory of words, as opposed to a theory of meanings, and
words can be manipulated without reference to meaning, then discussion of his [Loōmos’s]thought
was futile, his words impenetrable, his questions sham, his doctrines false,
his ontology illusory, for perhaps he was, in truth, a Poet, and not a
Philosopher” (6).
But whether poet or philosopher, Loōmos is destined to operate
through use of the human brain, which itself uses, or attempts to use faulty
logic and faulty words. This is self-evident at the beginning of the book. The
modus operandi of Loōmos—thinking, philosophizing, trying to make sense of
things through manipulating words—is on shaky grounds. But he never falls
silent, and the esoteric references continue: “the gods merely saw images of
insoluble equations, or irrational numbers, of Ptolemaic epicycles inscribing a
fiction as illusory as the dialectics of Zenon of Elea, those stark, sunlit
days on the Tyrrhenian Sea.”
So mathematics, as the author implies here, also is a dead
end. I’m reminded of the recent book by Benjamín Labatut, When We Cease To
Understand The World, which describes—in semifictional terms—the travails
of the great physicists and mathematicians of the twentieth century, such as Karl
Schwarzschild, Alexander Grothendieck, and Werner Heisenberg, who were
constantly on the verge of mental breakdown as they wracked their brains to
understand how the universe operates.
Like these men, Loōmos is, for the most part, lost in the
loneliness of the deep thinker. Throughout the whole book he wanders about as
solitary pilgrim, walks along with words, concepts, notions, hand in hand with
thinkers of the past but isolated from his fellow human beings. At one point he
mentions “withdrawing into the turpitude of my aloneness.” Could be that the
silent music that shows up in the final section is emblematic of the failure of
words for Loōmos,
and for the whole human race.
His basic predicament is perpetual loneliness, due to his
“dark and humorless nature” and his eternal hopeless striving for knowledge.
There is nothing of the light touch about Loōmos, and since he is basically
humorless—as is the entire text of the book—he, and the reader, can hope for no
relief in passages leavened by humor. Some relief, however, is provided by the
beautiful illustrations placed on pages facing the text. For the most part
these paintings are not directly relevant to the matter at hand. An exception
comes when the text mentions “a young girl kneeling before a woman dressed in
white,” and the painting on p. 34 shows us that girl and the woman in white.
The conversation here, between the woman—a kind of pseudo guardian angel—and
the girl, calls into question belief in a loving God. This is reinforced by the
epigraph from Jean Paul: “God is dead! The sky is empty . . . . Weep! Children,
you have no more father!”
Few conclusions are evident, or even possible. “Loōmos
slowly began to reach certain conclusions, which he tried to formulate in
everyday language,” but this, of course, goes against the grain of the whole
book’s style. “As he consolidated his thoughts, he sensed the inadequacies of
placing his ideas in ordinary language.” That, maybe, is a key sentence in the
book as a whole, where the language, steeped in the lushness of Romanticism, is
far from ordinary. And this: “He was aware of his turgid language, but found
that, at present, it best expressed his ideas.”
For the reader of this book it soon becomes obvious that
there are things more important than the literal meanings of words in passages:
the feel and sound of those words, their interaction with the graphic art
surrounding them and with the silent music of the final section. One can quote
numerous passages in which words appear to abandon their thrall to meaning;
looking to make much sense of such passages gets you nowhere.
“The Angels would recoil, and mime those parabolas through
which Mind sought to merge with the celestial spheres, and in that way give
form to the elemental opposites; for as the gods stood over and above the
Fates, the Angels would remain to further enforce the emulation or immolation
in the name of ‘received’ truths” (25).
“Rapt attention was paid to the entrance made by the
Temptations, a bouncing-off or reverberation following certain tendencies
established at a time mired in superstition, and anticipating Thomist ideology
stolen piecemeal from Averroës and Maimonides, who borrowed in turn
from pre-Socratic effusions via Plato and a recalcitrant Aristotle” (33).
“When at last alone again, balanced precariously between the
abyss and the teeming gardens of Dionysus, Loōmos felt a transcendent
madness in response to this enraptured solitude. Then the gods began appearing
singly and in pairs, giving rise to rumors of a Heaven lost to hopelessness;
and, in temporary residence, their defilements fed one upon the other in
increased ratio to the good desired from their encroachments. The Sun rose
again and contrasted sharply with these febrile offerings, rantings which, from
the mouths of gods, were savored as rare obloquy” (65).
d
The Songs and Laments of Loōmos probably fits best
into a long tradition of experimentation in Western literature—especially since
the Age of Modernism began (late 19th and early 20th
centuries). Impossible to grasp, the exact sense in passages such as those
cited above spills over into something like trans-sense. The trans-sense, or
trans-rational movement in Russian literature of the early twentieth century
was probably inspired by avant-garde literary movements in France and Germany.
Dadaism, e.g. was an important influence for the Russian Futurists, and probably
also for René
de Saint-Denis. “The works of French poets, Italian Futurists and the German
Expressionists would influence Dada’s rejection of the tight correlation
between words and meaning” (quote from Wikipedia article on Dadaism). Modernist
art prefers multiple viewpoints and discontinuous narratives. Sometimes artists
prefer obscurity to lucidity. Unity is mistrusted. So it is with Saint-Denis.
In an article on trans-sense literature, called ZAUM, the
Russian critic Viktor Shklovsky cited the 19th century poet Fet: “Oh
if only one could express/One’s soul without words.” Shklovsky’s article
continues as follows: “Thought and speech cannot keep up with what an inspired
man experiences; therefore, the artist is free to express himself not only in
ordinary language (concepts), but also in a personal language, a language that
has no precise meaning (that is not ossified), that is trans-sensible.
“Ordinary language restricts, free language allows freer
expression. Worlds die, the world is always young. The artist has seen the
world anew and, like Adam, gives to everything its name. The lily is wonderful,
but the word lily [lilia in Russian] is ugly; it is worn out and
‘raped’ So I name my lily euy and the original purity is restored.”
Shklovsky cites examples of experimentation that wrenches language out of its
norms from many different writers, such as this one from Kingsley Amis, to be
read in a Texas drawl: “Arcane standard Hannah More. Armageddon pierced staff.”
Meaning: I can’t stand it any more; I’m getting pissed off.
The Russian Futurist poets—most prominently Velimir
Khlebnikov and Aleksei Kruchenykh—wrote entire poems in incomprehensible (trans-rational)
language. Their aim was to “liberate sound from meaning to create a primeval
language of sounds.” Of course, their “tampering” with language caused a furor
in their time, and they were accused of babbling nonsense. People with meat and
potato brains screamed, “This is bullshit!” Meat-and-potato-head readers of René
de Saint-Denis today, no doubt, will voice similar sentiments.
One more quote from Shklovsky’s article (which is available
in English translation online): “Some people assert that they can best express
their emotions by a particular sound language that often has no definite
meaning but acts outside of or separately from meaning, immediately upon the
emotions of people around them.” A good deal has been written since the early
20th century on this sort of thing. William Empson, e.g., in his Seven
Types of Ambiguity, has mentioned “the doctrine of pure sound,” which
assumes that speech sounds in themselves have meaning. Artists steeped in
Modernism sometimes use obscurity as a conscious strategy. That want to avoid
having their works consumed and digested too easily. Everyday language is
suspect, as it can no longer be a medium for truth. Having grown stale and
threadbare, the language of the quotidian must have violence wreaked upon it—only
by suffering violence can it yield something novel, something of value.
Writers doing similar things in our time keep popping up.
Take Joy Williams. In a recent article in The New Yorker (Sept. 27,
2021), Katy Waldman writes that reading the short stories of Williams is “like
climbing an uneven staircase in a dream.” Her stories “offer a dark provisional
illumination, and they make the kind of sense that disperses upon waking.”
“She [Williams] seems especially attuned to the
psychoanalytic distinction between ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ content—the smoke
versus the fire beneath it. In ‘The Farm,’ from 1979, a woman utters words as
‘codes’ for other words, terrible words.”
“One of the strangest parts of reading Williams is the
jumpiness of her language, a feeling that her nouns and verbs, no matter how
meticulously ordered, might be arbitrary, a ‘code’ for things impossible to
say.” Here we are reminded, once again, of René de Saint-Denis, although his
literary style is not characterized by ‘jumpiness’ and little resembles that of
Joy Williams. Williams practices what Katy Waldman calls a kind of
“hallucinogenic realism.” The hallucinations of René de Saint-Denis—if that’s what
they may be called—are far from realism, are, in fact, more akin to
Romanticism.
The style of writing in the Loōmos book recalls the lushness
of the Romantic school; more likely it comes, however, out of the Neo-Romantic
school (Modernism, Symbolism) that was born as a rebellion against the stark,
unadorned Realism that preceded it. Throughout the whole book that features him
as central character, Loōmos ambulates through the verdure of perpetual opulent and
sumptuous language—but language whose meaning is less important than its
lushness.
As Waldman is led to assert through her reading of Joy
Williams, “If a new story is possible it will require an entirely different
language; the current one has been desecrated with the climate.” This recalls
Shklovsky’s mention of how words have been used, “raped.” Food for thought. As
the climate worsens, as we continue raping the natural world and the human race
descends toward an Armageddon of its own making, is the only legitimate
language left for literary writers one of experimentation—one practiced by
avant-garde belletrists such as Williams and Saint-Denis?
Maybe more and more frequently we will encounter literary
movements such as the recently founded “Poetry of Extinction.” Writers
belonging to this movement make it their task to write “audio-poetry” that
embodies the sounds of extinct animals. Most recently they have
produced—reproduced in poetic form—sounds emitted by the ivory-billed
woodpecker as recorded in 1935. This “poetry,” plus photographs and videotapes,
are all that we have left of the ivory-billed, a woodpecker (related to the
pileated) who was once the largest woodpecker resident in the U.S.A. The last
confirmed sighting of the ivory-billed was in 1944.
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